

ON HER MAJESTY'S SECRET SERVICE

Britain's MI6 goes to extraordinary lengths to ensure the security of its intelligence operations, conducting them under the cover of official secrecy.

Part 1 of 2

by Stephen Dorril © 2000

From chapter 36 of his book
MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service

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Agent D/813317 Richard Tomlinson joined Britain's MI6 in 1991. Born in New Zealand, he read aeronautical engineering at Cambridge and was a Kennedy memorial scholar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA. Fluent in French, German and Spanish, Tomlinson was approached at university where he gained a first. A lecturer had asked him if he wanted to do "something stimulating" in the foreign service. Despite modern recruiting methods, the trusted old-boy network is still a favoured option at Oxbridge, and a number of other key universities, such as Durham and Exeter, still have a contact group of lecturers on the lookout for "firsts" as suitable recruits.

Historian Andrew Roberts has written about his own experience of being approached in 1987 to join the "FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office] Co-ordinating Staff", as MI6 is known: the "chat with a Cambridge contact", tea at the John Nash-designed Carlton House which overlooks St James's Park, "a discreet lunch a fortnight later and then a delightfully absurd mini-exam, in which one of the questions was, 'Put the following in order of social precedence: earl, duke, viscount, baron, marquis'". At Century House, Roberts recognised "several of the young Miss Moneypennys from the secretarial schools' parties at university". The questions continued in a farcical vein: "If I had been a communist, a fascist or a homosexual... Where do Britain's best long-term interests lie—Washington, Brussels or Moscow?" During the medical examination, he was told that "with Oxford, it's the drugs thing; with Cambridge, it's the boys". Attitudes have changed, and by 1997 MI6 was prepared to post a "gay couple"—"counsellor" and chief of station Christopher Hurran and his long-time Venezuelan lover—to the British Embassy in Czechoslovakia. A few years earlier, the Service had recruited a member of CND.

Finally, Roberts went through the process of positive vetting (known since 1990 as "EPV"). It is generally conducted by a semi-retired officer with a false name, who interviews referees and other contacts and undertakes checks on creditworthiness. Suitable candidates are put through the fast-stream Civil Service Selection Board. Roberts, however, decided not to join, and Tomlinson did so only after spending a number of years travelling and working in the City, during which time he had also signed up for the SAS territorial regiment. Over the last decade the Service has recruited a number of personnel from the special forces, though their gung-ho philosophy seems at odds with the image that MI6 has projected of the modern spy. Tomlinson eventually joined MI6 for old-fashioned "patriotic reasons" and sat the standard Foreign Office entry examination before being accepted onto the intelligence service training course.

New recruits are introduced to the traditional "tradecraft" of the world of spying and gain a broad range of knowledge from recruiting and running agents to developing agents of influence and organising and servicing "dead letter" drops. Because of the smaller numbers, MI6 officers indulge in less specialisation than their American counterparts, though the techniques are essentially little different from those used at the beginning of the century. The infamous Dreyfus affair began when a cleaning woman, Marie Bastian, working in the German Embassy but employed by the French Secret Service, handed over to her French controller the contents of the wastepaper baskets she emptied. MI6 recruiters still look out for "the life-and-soul-of-the-party types who could persuade the Turkish ambassador's secretary to go through her boss's wastepaper basket". These days, however, the spy is armed with a hand-held digital scanner which can hold the filched material in its memory and can also be used in emergencies to transmit the stolen secrets by burst transmissions via a satellite.

Such gadgets are developed for the Directorate of Special Support responsible for

providing technical assistance to operations—staffed by MoD [Ministry of Defence] locksmiths, video and audio technicians and scientists in sections devoted to chemicals and electronics, forensic services, electronic support measures, electronic surveillance and explosives systems. While the gadgets continue to provide the modern spy with a James Bond-like image—for instance, identification transmitters that can be hidden in an agent's shoes to enable the monitoring by satellite of their precise location—the reality is that most of the work is mundane and office-bound. Trainees still receive small-arms training at Fort Monkton, but much of the training is taken up with learning to use the computer system and writing reports in the house style.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

As part of the Service's obsession with security, a great deal of time is spent on being indoctrinated in cipher and communications work.

Trainee officers are instructed on how to encrypt messages for transmission and how to use the manual B*** cipher, which is regarded as particularly secure. [See Editor's Note.] Used at stations abroad to transmit details of operations, potential sources and defectors, B*** is sent either via the diplomatic bag or by special SIS [Secret Intelligence

Service] courier. Diplomatic bags are not totally secure, as the success of the Service's own N-Section testified. It employed up to 30 people in Palmer Street, rifling the opened bags which were then expertly resealed. The work petered out in the mid-1960s as other means of communication took over.

Officers learn about "off-line" systems for the encryption of messages, such as N*****, used prior to transmission by cipher machines, and "on-line" systems for the protection of telegrams during transmission, code-named H*** and T*****. They are indoctrinated into the use of certain cryptonyms for forwarding telegrams to particular organisations and offices, such as SIS

headquarters which is designated A****. They also learn about code-words with which sensitive messages are headlined, indicating to whom they may be shown. UK EYES ALPHA warns that the contents are not to be shown to any foreigners and are intended only for the home intelligence and security services, armed forces and Whitehall recipients. UK EYES B includes the above categories, the Northern Ireland Office, LIST X firms engaged in the manufacture of sensitive equipment, and certain US, Australian, New Zealand and Canadian intelligence personnel liaising with the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in London. Additional code-words mark specific exclusions and inclusions. E***** material cannot be shown to the Americans, while

L***** deprives local intelligence officials and agencies of its content. Material for named individual officers, sometimes at specified times, is headed D**** or D****, while particularly sensitive material about a fellow officer or operation is known as D*****.


The protection of files and their secure handling is a top priority, with officers taught to keep a classified record of their use and location. Photocopiers have the ability to mark and check the origin of non-authorized copies of classified material.

Following the development by MoD scientists of a means of reading a computer disc without a computer, all discs are protected in transit. All correspondence by letter is secured by specially developed red security tape which leaves detectable signs if tampered with, though near-undetectable photographic and laser techniques exist for reading the inside of mail and opening envelopes. Each officer has his own safe with dual-combination locking, while the filing cabinets with false tumbler locks as an added precaution are protected from penetration by X-rays. Since no lock is secure from picking, they collapse internally if anything more than the slightest force is used. In the event of drilling, a glass plate inside the door shatters, releasing a spring-loaded bolt to prevent opening. Frequent random checks take place on the number settings to see if the safe has been opened illegally.

These bureaucratic procedures and attention to minute security rules are not merely technical; failure to carry out security precautions can lead to points deduction in the security breach points system. If an officer racks up 160 points over three years (a breach of TOP SECRET counts as 80 points), this may lead to security clearance being withdrawn and instant dismissal.

New officers are initially based at the exotic Vauxhall Bridge headquarters, about which many Service personnel are sensitive, almost embarrassed. Access to "Ceausescu Towers", as some officers have dubbed it, is gained by use of a swipe card and PIN number. The

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Menwith Hill "communications relay centre", Harrogate, UK

(Photo by Paula Solloway)

interior comprises a hive of bare, unmarked air-conditioned corridors. The only visible signs of occupancy are the acronyms on the doors, with nothing on the walls except floor plans and exit signs.

As with major stations abroad, such as Moscow and Beijing, Vauxhall Cross is classified as a Category A post, with a high potential physical threat from terrorism (HPT) and sophisticated hostile intelligence services (HIS). Operatives from the Technical Security Department (TSD) based at Hanslope Park, Milton Keynes, and from MI6's own technical department ensure that the building is protected from high-tech attack (HTA). There is triple glazing installed on all windows as a safeguard against laser and radiofrequency (RF) flooding techniques, and the mainframe computer, cipher and communications areas are housed in secure, modular, shielded rooms. A secure command-and-control room runs major operations—such as those in Bosnia, where "war criminals" were tracked and arrested by SAS personnel. Off the corridors are open-plan offices which give the impression of informality, though security overrides such considerations.

A new officer will find that more women than men are recruited to the Service (as has been the case since 1996), but men remain predominant particularly in senior positions. As in many modern offices, officers will be seen working at computers, processing information, collating files, planning operations, liaising with foreign intelligence agencies and networks and, most importantly, supporting the 300 to 500 officers in the field, though only half that number will be stationed abroad at any one time.

MI6 has been at the forefront of updating its information technology, and in 1995 installed at a cost of £200 million an ambitious desktop network, known as the Automatic Telegram Handling System (ATHS/OATS), which provides access to all reports and databases.

Staff are officially not allowed to discuss their work with colleagues, not even when they relax in the staff bar with its spectacular views over the River Thames, though, as Richard Tomlinson discovered, gossip is in fact rife.

FOREIGN POSTINGS AND "INFORMATION OPERATIONS"

All officers will spend time in the field attached to embassies, though they will have little choice as to the location. Turning down a post will jeopardise future promotions and can lead to dismissal. Stations abroad are classed from the high-risk Category A, such as Yugoslavia and Algeria, to the lesser B, such as Washington and New York, C, the European countries, and D, often the Commonwealth, where there is little or no threat.

New officers might find themselves among the additional personnel sent to Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea, following the Service's boost to its presence in South-East Asia, or involved in operations into China, as followed the transfer of Hong Kong and the winding up of the Service's espionage operations in the former colony.

In a large station such as Washington, operating under "light" diplomatic cover will be a head of station (often a Counsellor), a deputy, and two or three officers (First and Second secretaries). There will also be back-up staff consisting of three or four secretaries, a registry clerk to handle files and documents, and communications and cipher officers. Easily identified by the trained eye in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office Diplomatic List—the number of Counsellor and First Secretary posts is limited and there tend to be too many for the positions available—an MI6 officer's presence will be known to the host intelligence and security agency. In some cases, a senior officer will make his presence known to draw attention away from his colleagues.

Before postings and missions abroad, officers receive a briefing from the Information Operations (I/Ops) unit which provides them with a list of sympathetic journalists who can be trusted to give them help and information. These contacts have become increasingly important in trouble-spots such as the Balkans.

I/Ops also has a more covert role in planning psychological operations along the lines of the old Special Political Action (SPA) section and the Information Research Department (IRD). I/Ops may also, according to a former MI6 officer, "attempt to influence events in another country or organisation in a direction favourable to Britain". One example is MI6's determined effort to "plant stories in the American press about Boutros-Ghali, whom they regarded as dangerously Francophile, in the run-up to the 1992 elections for UN Secretary-General".

Foreign operations of this sort do not require ministerial sanction.¹

I/Ops also expends considerable energy behind the scenes in "surfacing" damaging stories designed to discredit critics of the Service. They will use off-the-record briefings of sympathetic journalists, the planting of rumours and disinformation which through "double-sourcing" are confirmed by a pro-active agent, and the overt recruitment of journalist agents. Journalists paid to provide information or to "keep their eyes open" are known as "assets" or "assistants" or just "on side".

According to Richard Tomlinson, paid agents included in the 1990s one and perhaps two national newspaper editors. An editor is unlikely to be directly recruited, as the Service would require the permission of the Foreign Secretary and would not like to be put in the position of being refused. Such high-fliers are more likely to have been recruited early in their careers. In this case, the journalist was apparently recruited at least three years before becoming an editor and remained an asset until at least 1998. Tomlinson has said that the editor was paid a retainer of £100,000, with access to the money via an offshore bank in an accessible tax haven. The editor was given a false passport to gain entry to the bank, which he regularly visited.²

In trying to identify the editor "agent", media interest centred on Dominic Lawson, son of the former Tory Chancellor of the Exchequer, who became editor of the *Spectator* in 1990 and had been editor of the *Sunday Telegraph* since 1995. Lawson denied that he had ever been "an agent, either paid or unpaid, of MI6 or

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of any other government agency". On the other hand, the youngest brother of Lawson's second wife, Rosa Monckton, had joined MI6 in 1987. In 1996, Anthony Monckton was appointed First Secretary (Political) in the Croatian capital Zagreb.

Quite separately, the Princess of Wales—one of Rosa's closest friends and a godparent to the Lawsons' daughter—had clearly been under some kind of surveillance, as evidenced by the 1,050-page dossier held by the US National Security Agency (NSA) in its archive, detailing private telephone conversations between Diana and American friends intercepted at MI6's request. While all stories linking MI6 to the Princess's death in the car accident in France have been complete nonsense, it has been alleged that working closely with I/Ops in an attempt to deflect enquiries away from the security services had been a chief of staff to "C", Richard Spearman, temporarily posted to the Paris embassy with his assistant, Nicholas Langman.³

Operational officers can be casually spotted by the ***** roller-ball pens in their top pocket (it was discovered by accident that they have the ability to create invisible ink), the Psion organiser and the specially adapted Walkman they carry to record conversations for up to ten minutes on the middle band of an ordinary commercial music cassette tape. They also use laptop computers for writing reports. If that seems like a recipe for disaster, the secret hard disc contains a protected back-up.

The station is usually sited in a part of the embassy regularly swept by technical staff for bugs and other electronic attack. It is entered using special door codes with an inner strongroom-type door for greater security. Following all the procedures learned during training, officers handling material up to the SECRET level work on secure overseas Unix terminals (S****) and use a messaging system known as ARRAMIS. Conversations by secure telephone masked by white noise are undertaken via a special SIS version of the BRAHMS system. A special chip developed by GCHQ [Government Communications Headquarters] apparently makes it impossible even for the US NSA to decipher such conversations. Secure Speech System (H*****) handset units are used by SIS officers within a telephone speech enclosure. The most important room is electronically shielded and lined with up to a foot of lead for secure cipher and communications transmissions. From the comms room, an officer can send and receive secure faxes up to SECRET level via the C***** fax system and S***** encrypted communications with the Ministry of Defence, Cabinet Office, MI5 (code-name SNUFFBOX), GCHQ and 22 SAS. An encrypted electronic messaging system working through fibre optics, known as the UK Intelligence Messaging Network, was installed in early 1997 and enables MI6 to flash intelligence scoops to special terminals in the MoD, the Foreign Office and the Department of Trade and Industry. Manned twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, and secured behind a heavy thick door, the cipher machines have secure "integral protection" known as TEMPEST. MI6 officers abroad also work alongside GCHQ personnel, monitoring foreign missions and organisations.

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Officers in the field may include not only those officially classed as diplomats, but also others operating under "deep" cover. Increasingly, MI6 officers abroad act as "illegals". It is known that Service officers are sometimes employed during the day in conventional jobs such as accountancy and provided with false identities. British banks—the Royal Bank of Scotland is particularly helpful, and to a lesser extent the Midland—help supply credit cards to officers working under cover. At the end of each month, officers have to pay off their aliases' credit cards. Banks also help transmit money overseas for covert operations. During the Cold War, banks in the Channel Islands and other off-shore locations acted as a conduit for secret funding.⁴

Recruiting or running agents and gathering intelligence are the prime objectives of these deep-cover operatives, and their real work, some claim, starts at six in the evening when the conventional diplomats begin their round of cocktail parties. Such social events can be very useful for gathering intelligence and spreading disinformation. Baroness Park recalled that one of MI6's more successful ploys was "to set people very discreetly against one another". "They destroy each other. You don't destroy them." Officers would offer the odd hint that it was "a pity that so-and-so is so indiscreet"; not much more. Officers will also deal with paid "support agents"—those who supply MI6 with facilities including safe houses and bank accounts as well as intelligence. There are also "long insiders"—agents of influence with access to MI6 assessments and sanitised intelligence. The Service's deep-cover agents have burst transmitters with the ability to transmit a flash signal to MI6 via a satellite when they are in danger.⁵

Officers abroad may also be asked to aid more sophisticated operations designed to build up the Service's psychological profiles of political leaders. A special department within MI6 has tried in the past to procure the urine and excrement of foreign leaders. A specially modified condom was used to catch the urine of

Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu, while the "product" of Cuban President Fidel Castro and Russian President Leonid Brezhnev was "analysed" by medical specialists for signs of their true health.

TOMLINSON'S UNDER-COVER MISSIONS

Tomlinson's duties included recruiting agents to inform on foreign politicians. His most important task was to infiltrate in 1992 a Middle Eastern weapons procurement programme network—the BMP3—with the object of locating and disabling a chemical weapons facility. Authorised by an unnamed senior Cabinet minister, the sabotage plan—one account suggests the planting of a bomb—aimed to intercept a shipment of machinery and interfere with its extractor fan equipment, despite warnings of the possible risk to the lives of dozens of civilian workers at the plant.

In November 1992, using the name "Andrew Huntley" and the pretext of assisting at a conference run by the *Financial Times*, Tomlinson went under cover to Moscow. His very sensitive

mission was to obtain Russian military secrets on ballistic missiles and effect the defection of a Russian colonel who specialised in this area. Although, strangely, he was not given the usual "immersion" language training in Serbo-Croat, Tomlinson soon found himself in the former Yugoslavia, whose break-up had taken the Service by surprise.⁶

When the country fractured in January 1991 into Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, EU [European Union] recognition of independent Croatia proved to be a critical and disastrous policy, eventually paving the way for Serb aggression which the Foreign Office interpreted as civil war. MI6 had been running a few federal sources in the old Yugoslavia, but they provided little worthwhile intelligence.

The Service lacked appropriate linguists and had to start more or less from scratch. The JIC established a Current Intelligence Group (CIG) on the Balkans, and within 18 months MI6's Controllerate dealing with the area had recruited a number of sources at a high level from among the ethnic military and political protagonists.

During 1993, as a "targeting officer" within the Balkans Controllerate whose job was to identify potential informants, Tomlinson spent a harrowing and dangerous six months travelling as a journalist to Belgrade, Skopje, Zagreb and Ljubljana, in the process recruiting a Serb journalist (journalists of every nationality were a particular MI6 target in the Balkans, as they proved to be more productive than most other sources) and a leader of the Albanian opposition in Macedonia. In 1993, UN blue-helmeted troops started patrolling the borders of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. According to sources, MI6 used air-drops in an operation to set up arms dumps on the border of Macedonia as part of a "Stay Behind" network.⁷

Another operation included running as an agent a Tory MP, who gave information about foreign donations to the Conservative Party. Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Northern Ireland Minister, Harold Elleston was an old Etonian who studied Russian at Exeter University and subsequently became a trade consultant specialising in the former Eastern Bloc countries, during which time he was recruited by MI6. He worked for them in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and during the conflict in former Yugoslavia.

After visiting former Yugoslavia in 1992, Elleston, who was employed by a lobbying firm with Conservative candidate John Kennedy (aka Gvozdenovic), notified his MI6 handlers that donations were reaching the Conservative Party from Serbia. Despite Harold Wilson's ruling in the 1960s that the intelligence services would not use MPs as agents, the Service received special sanction from Prime Minister John Major to continue Elleston's secret role. Sir Colin McColl warned Major that the party was possibly accepting tainted money via Kennedy, a key figure in arranging payments from the Serb regime.⁸

MI6 & THE FOREIGN OFFICE'S BALKANS AGENDA

MI6 was itself seen as being pro-Serb in its reporting. In 1994, two articles arguing against Western policy in the Balkans conflict appeared in the *Spectator* (the right-wing magazine unknowingly served as "cover" for three MI6 officers working in Bosnia, Belgrade and Moldova), written under a Sarajevo dateline by a "Kenneth Roberts", who had apparently worked for more than a year with the United Nations in Bosnia as an "adviser". Written by MI6 officer Keith Robert Craig, who was attached to the MoD's Balkan Secretariat, the first article, published on 5 February, rehearsed arguments for a UN withdrawal from the

area, pointing out that all sides committed atrocities. The second, on 5 March, complained baselessly about "warped" and inaccurate reports—by the BBC's Kate Adie, in particular—of an atrocity against the Bosnian Serbs.

Guardian correspondent Ed Vulliamy recalled being invited to a briefing by MI6 which was "peddling an ill-disguised agenda: the Foreign Office's determination that there be no intervention against Serbia's genocidal pogrom". The carnage that took place in Sarajevo's marketplace was described, without

the slightest evidence, as the work of the Muslim-led government which was alleged to be "massacring its own people to win sympathy and ultimately help from outside". As Vulliamy knew, Sarajevo's defenders were "dumb with disbelief". Despite UN Protection Force reports which found that it was Serb mortars which were killing Muslims, the MI6 scheme "worked—beautifully", as the allegations found their way into the world's press. Vulliamy noted that "it was quickly relished by the only man who stood to gain from this: the Serbian leader Radovan Karadzic".⁹

Perhaps it was only an Intelligence/Foreign Office faction which was pro-Serb. From March 1992 until September 1993, Tomlinson worked in the East European Controllerate under the staff designation UKA/7. He has claimed that in the summer of 1992 he discovered an internal document that detailed plans to assassinate President Slobodan Milosevic. During a conversation,

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Richard Tomlinson

an ambitious and serious colleague, Nick Fishwick, who was responsible for developing and targeting operations in the Balkans (P4/Ops), had pulled out a file and handed it to Tomlinson to read. "It was approximately two pages long, and had a yellow card attached to it which signified that it was an accountable document rather than a draft proposal." It was entitled "The need to assassinate President Milosevic of Serbia", and was distributed to senior MI6 officers including: the head of Balkan operations (P4), Maurice Kenwick-Piercy; the Controller of Eastern European operations (C/CEE), Richard Fletcher, and later, Andrew Fulton; the security officer responsible for Eastern European operations (SBO1/T), John Ridd; the private secretary to the Chief (H/SECT), Alan Petty ("Alan Judd"); and the Service's SAS liaison officer (MODA/SO), Major Glynne Evans. According to Tomlinson, Fishwick justified assassinating Milosevic on the grounds that there was evidence that "the Butcher of Belgrade" was supplying weapons to Karadzic, who was wanted for war crimes including genocide. US and French intelligence agencies were alleged to be already contemplating assassinating Karadzic.

There were three possible scenarios put forward by MI6. Firstly, to train a Serbian paramilitary opposition group to carry out the assassination. This, Fishwick argued, had the advantage of deniability but the disadvantage that control of the operation would be low and the chances of success unpredictable. Secondly, to use the small INCREMENT cell of SAS/SBS personnel, which is especially selected and trained to carry out operations exclusively for MI6/MI5, to send in a team that would assassinate the President with a bomb or by a sniper ambush. Fishwick said that this would be the most reliable option, but would be undeniable if the operation went wrong. Thirdly, to kill Milosevic in a road crash which would be staged during one of his visits to the international conferences on former Yugoslavia in Geneva. Fishwick suggested that a stun device could be used to dazzle the driver of Milosevic's car as it passed through one of Geneva's motorway tunnels.¹⁰

A year later, Tomlinson acted as a Counsellor to the Commander of the British forces in Bosnia and worked at manipulating sources in the Karadzic entourage. One participant to these operations suggests that these sources "produced a very detailed intelligence picture which included not just the military plans and capabilities of the different factions, but also early warning of political intentions". There appears to have been little evidence of this intelligence coup in the Foreign Office decisions that followed, and its value is contradicted by another source which, while admitting that several significant agents were recruited, concludes that they did not "produce substantial intelligence of quality".¹¹

The intelligence deficit was worsened by the US unwillingness to provide its Atlantic partner with all its intelligence on the

Serbs. General Sir Michael Rose, a former head of the SAS and Commander-in-Chief of the UN Protection Force, realised that during 1994 all his communications were being electronically intercepted and his headquarters in Sarajevo "bugged" by the Americans, because Washington—which wanted to use NATO air strikes to bomb the Serbs to the negotiating table—thought the British were too supportive of the Bosnian Serbs. The Americans also monitored the communications of SAS scouts deep in Bosnian territory and discovered that they were deliberately failing to identify Serb artillery positions. This lack of trust caused friction and led to a backstage confrontation between the secret services. It reminded some observers that the special relationship existed only on the basis that the US saw Britain as a chance to extend its reach into Europe.¹²

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Endnotes

1. *Punch*, no. 71, 2 January 1999.
2. *Sunday Business*, 20 December 1998, 24 January 1999. Family friend and former Conservative defence procurement minister, Jonathan Allen, who was an MI6 agent, providing insights into the Saudi royal family and their defence spending plans.
3. *Sunday Business*, *ibid*.
4. *Sunday Business*, 11 October 1998.
5. *Observer*, 21 November 1993; *Panorama*, BBC1, 22 December 1993.
6. *Sunday Times*, 22 September 1996, 21 December 1997, 2 August 1998.
7. *ibid*.
8. *Observer*, 22 December 1996.
9. *Guardian*, 25 March 1998, 7 October 1998; *Sunday Times*, 30 August 1998; *Independent*, 2 September 1998.
10. *ibid*.
11. Urban, Mark, *UK Eyes Alpha: The Inside Story of British Intelligence*, pp. 215-16; *Sunday Times*, 22 September 1996, 21 December 1997, 2 August 1998.
12. *Guardian*, 20 December 1994; *Times*, 10 November 1998.

About the Author:

Stephen Dorril is a writer/researcher in the field of security and intelligence services. He has written articles for major UK newspapers, magazines and journals, and has appeared on numerous radio and television programs. Stephen is also a co-founder of the respected British journal *Lobster*.

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- Stephen Dorril's article is edited from chapter 36 (pages 783-800) of his book, *MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service* (published by The Free Press, New York, 2000). NEXUS downloaded the extract from the Cryptome website, <http://cryptome.org/mi6-sd36.htm>.
- Cryptome advises that code-word, cipher and communications systems disguised by the author on legal advice are shown as printed (e.g., "B***"). It invites information for publication on the true form of these code-words as well as information about the systems; e-mail jya@pipeline.com.